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Abstract
We propose a new approach to belief revision that
provides a way to change knowledge bases with
a minimum of effort. We call this way of revis-
ing belief states optimal belief revision. Our re-
vision method gives special attention to the fact
that most belief revision processes are directed to
a specific informational objective. This approach
to belief change is founded on notions such as op-
timal context and accessibility. For the sentential
model of belief states we provide both a formal de-
scription of contexts as sub-theories determined
by three parameters and a method to construct
contexts. Next, we introduce an accessibility or-
dering for belief sets, which we then use for se-
lecting the best (optimal) contexts with respect
to the processing effort involved in the revision.
Then, for finitely axiomatizable knowledge bases,
we characterize a finite accessibility ranking from
which the accessibility ordering for the entire base
is generated and show how to determine the rank-
ing of an arbitrary sentence in the language. Fi-
nally, we define the adjustment of the accessibility
ranking of a revised base of a belief set.
Introduction
In this paper we put forward a new approach to changes
in knowledge bases. Two main reasons led us to this
approach to belief revision. One of these reasons orig-
inates in the intuition that in a belief revision process
only part of the knowledge base has an active role in
the integration of a new belief in the base. Therefore
a belief revision process involving only that sub-system
of beliefs can capture the essence of this process and
reach the same effects as the traditional way of belief
changing with a diminished processing effort. The other
idea comes naturally when the belief revision process is
placed in a communication environment.1 People are
changing their minds when interacting with the world,
including the others’ beliefs, and usually when they are
looking for answers to their questions. Not every fact
or evidence is worth incorporating in our belief systems
1This approach was suggested by Sperber and Wilson’s
relevance theory. Refer to Sperber and Wilson (1986).
but only information that is relevant for us with respect
to our informational needs. Consider that two intelli-
gent agents are involved in a goal-driven dialogue. One
of them, called the inquirer, is “interested” in acquiring
a piece of information that would produce, by means
of a belief revision process, the fulfillment of its objec-
tive or desideratum. The other agent’s role is to present
facts that would help the inquirer attain its goal.
Given an incoming piece of information, one’s be-
liefs, and the desideratum, our purpose is to process
the available information efficiently in order to fulfill the
desideratum. We use terms like optimal and efficiency
throughout this paper with the meaning of a compari-
son or ratio between the effects and effort corresponding
to a belief revision process. However, these terms are
not related to computational complexity. Instead, the
effects represent information derived when incorporat-
ing a piece of evidence in the knowledge base; the effort
required to reach such effects is mostly characterized
by the notion of accessibility. A formal definition of
the accessibility ordering will be provided later in this
paper.
We call this way of revising belief systems optimal
belief revision. Defining a way of revising a knowledge
base efficiently reduces to choosing optimal contexts.
The notion of context is related to and determined by
three parameters: the new belief, one’s knowledge base
and the desideratum, and it represents any part of the
knowledge base that actually contributes to the integra-
tion of the new belief. The optimal context is a context
in which the new piece of information will be the most
efficiently processed such that the desideratum is met.
Both constructive and descriptive approaches to con-
texts are considered. In the third section we stipulate
the conditions that circumscribe the set of context can-
didates, from which the optimal context is chosen. In
the fourth section we give an explicit construction for
(optimal) contexts. In the fifth section we introduce
the concept of accessibility. Finally, for finitely axiom-
atizable knowledge bases (theories2), we define a finite
accessibility ranking from which the accessibility order-
2By theory we mean any set of sentences closed under the
consequence operation Cn provided by the classical propo-
sitional calculus.
ing for the entire base is generated. Also, we will see
how from a finite accessibility ranking one can adjust
the ranking of a repeatedly revised belief set.
Related Work
We mention three important sources related to
our work. Firstly, the axiomatic and construc-
tive approaches for contraction functions presented in
Ga¨rdendors (1988) serve as models for characterizing
(optimal) contexts from the same perspectives. More-
over, the definition and analysis of epistemic entrench-
ment in relation to contraction functions guided us in
defining the accessibility notion and relate it to mod-
elling optimal contexts. Secondly, relevance theory in-
troduced in Sperber and Wilson (1986) motivated us
to apply relevance theory to belief revision by placing
agents in a communicative environment. Thirdly, in
Williams (1998), Mary-Anne Williams uses a finite par-
tial entrenchment ranking to generate an entrenchment
ordering and describes a computational model that ad-
justs this ranking using an absolute measure of minimal
change. Later sections of our paper focus on the same
matters using the accessibility relation instead.
Contexts: Descriptive Approach
Consider a language L whose logic includes classical
propositional logic. Beliefs and contexts are represented
by closed sets of sentences (belief sets).
Let K ⊆ L be the initial belief set of the inquirer.
Suppose that the inquirer’s objective/desideratum is
based on a presupposition P , which is a sentence in
L, precisely a disjunction of possible answers to a ques-
tion: P = G1 ∨ G2 ∨ . . . ∨ Gn.3 We consider that the
presupposition is one of the beliefs in K, P ∈ K.
Each Gi ∈ L is called a basic goal. A disjunction of
at most n− 1 such basic goals is considered also a goal.
Any goal achieves the desideratum, but a basic goal is
preferred rather than a goal.
To attain its desideratum, the inquirer must derive
one of these goals from a belief revision process. Let
A ∈ L be the new piece of information acquired by the
inquirer, which is used in the belief revision process.
In this setting, contexts are considered subsets of K
that are also closed under logical consequence. Choos-
ing a context whenever some new evidence is incorpo-
rated in K depends upon three parameters: the belief
set K, the new evidence A and a certain goal G or
desideratum. They will appear as constants through-
out our analysis. Contexts are considered optimal if for
some K, A and G, the effort required for processing A
in that context such that G is derived is as small as
possible. Both the notion of accessibility and the num-
ber of sentences in a context have to be considered in
assessing a certain processing effort.
3The notions of desideratum and presupposition origi-
nate in Hintikka’s approach to interrogatives; see Hintikka
(1989), p.158.
The next theorem4 provides a description of (poten-
tially optimal) contexts given the above-cited param-
eters. The first part (i)) of Theorem 1 characterizes
contexts when no desideratum or goal is assumed. The
second part adds new conditions for contexts when this
parameter is considered as well. It is supposed that the
revision, expansion and contraction operators respect
the AGM postulates.
Theorem 1 Let K be a belief set and “*” a revision
operator. Let us denote by “−” the contraction operator
that is related to “*” through the Levi Identity.5
i) For any belief set K ′ ⊆ K, if
K ′ \K ′
−
¬A = K \K
−
¬A, then (1)
K∗A = Cn [K
′∗
A ∪ (K \K
′)]. (2)
ii) If there is a sentence G ∈ L, such that
(a) G /∈ K; (b) G ∈ K∗A
then there is a belief set K ′ ⊆ K satisfying condi-
tion (1) and:
• K ′−¬A 6= ∅ if A 6⊢ G;
• G ∈ K ′∗A;
• If ¬G ∈ K then ¬G ∈ K ′.
Since in the limiting case K ′ can be identified with
K, the first part of Theorem 1 says that for any be-
lief set K we can always identify a sub-theory K ′ of
K, whose revision with a new belief A tells us exactly
what sentences are retracted from K when revising K
with A. K ′ is chosen such that exactly the same beliefs
are retracted from both K and K ′ when revising these
belief sets with the same sentence A. This means that
no sentences that could contribute to the derivation of
A are left in the remainder K \K ′. Moreover, attaching
the revised “context” to this remainder does not lead to
the negation of A, unless ¬A is a tautology. The rela-
tionship between a belief set K and one of its contexts
associated to A are presented in the following corollary:
Corollary 2 For a revision operator “*” and two belief
sets K and K ′ such that K ′ ⊆ K and K ′ \ K ′−¬A =
K \K−¬A
6, the following conditions hold:
a) 1. K ′
−
¬A ⊆ K
−
¬A; (Monotony)
2. K ′
∗
¬A ⊆ K
∗
¬A;
b) K ′
−
¬A ∪ (K \K
′) 6⊢ ¬A if 6⊢ ¬A.
In order to understand the significance of part ii) of
Theorem 1, consider the following situation: An agent
makes inquiries in order to attain a certain information-
goal G that would achieve its desideratum. In order
to choose the right context, one should focus on two
aspects:
4The proofs of all the theorems can be found in Vodislav
(2000).
5. . . , that is, for any belief set K, K∗A = (K
−
¬A
)+
A
. See
Ga¨rdenfors (1988) p.69.
6. . . , where the relationship between “*” and “-” is given
through the Levi Identity.
I) the context should include those sentences that
help to establish which beliefs are being retracted
from the initial belief set in order to accommodate
the new evidence;
II) the context should include the beliefs that together
with the new one contribute to the derivation of the
goal.
If one is interested in choosing contexts that satisfy
the first requirement then the solution is to be found
in Theorem 1 part i). Precisely, a minimal belief set
K ′m is required. Note that for a given K, the set of
all K ′ satisfying the conditions (1) and (2) specified by
the theorem is partially ordered. Each totally ordered
maximal subset of this class has a minimal element,
therefore the class of K ′ has at least one minimal ele-
ment K ′m.
In order to meet requirement II) the context obey-
ing condition I) must satisfy additional restrictions, as
specified in part ii) of Theorem 1. Condition ii) stip-
ulates the following: Supposing that the goal can only
be contextually derived and can be implied by neither
the new evidence A nor the initial knowledge base K,
we want to choose such a context K ′ that does not be-
come empty after retracting ¬A from it. This condition
makes sense even when ¬A /∈ K since it requires that
K ′ is nonempty as long as the goal is contextually de-
rived from A. The second part of ii) says that the goal
will be obtained from the processing of the new evi-
dence A in the context K ′. Also if the agent’s original
base includes the negation of the goal, in order to derive
the goal from the revised knowledge base, ¬G must be
contained in the contextK ′. Note that when processing
a piece of information A in a context K ′, if that belief
is already part of the agent’s old knowledge base then
there is no goal G satisfying the conditions specified in
ii). In this case, attaining goal G is already achieved
without incorporating A in K. The revision of K ′ with
A could only result in a change in the entrenchment
degree of A, provided that an epistemic entrenchment
ordering for K (and for K ′) is assumed.
Belief sets that satisfy conditions (1) and ii) form
a partially ordered set having at least one ⊆-minimal
element. By choosing a minimal K ′, we ensure the min-
imality requirement of an optimal context. The mini-
mality requirement is present also in the constructive
approach to optimal contexts.
Theorem 1 can be reformulated for bases of belief
sets. The changes consist of replacing belief set K with
the base BK and K
′ with a subset B′K of BK , A ∈ K
with BK ⊢ A, etc.
Contexts: Constructive Approach
There are several ways to construct contexts: from
entailment-sets of ¬A and G, from maximal subsets
of K that fail to entail ¬A, using Grove’s system of
spheres7 and from epistemic entrenchment and acces-
7See Grove (1988).
sibility orderings. For lack of space, we will present
only the first method here. The others can be found in
Vodislav (2000).
An A-entailment set is a set of sentences each of
which is essential for the derivation of the sentence A.
Definition 1 The set of sentences X is an A-
entailment set in a belief set K if and only if: a)
X ⊆ K; b) A ∈ Cn; c) for any proper subset Y of
X, A /∈ Cn(Y ).8
Using the notion of “entailment set of a sentence in
a belief set” we can define the context K ′ as the logical
closure of the union of two subsets, one responsible for
the derivation of ¬A and the other for the entailment
of G:
K ′ = Cn [K ′¬A ∪K
′
G] (3)
where
• K ′¬A =
⋃
(A-entailment set inK)
• K ′G = (any)XG such that XG ⊆ K and XG ∪ {A}
is a G-entailment set in K∗A.
When constructing K ′G, a construction for K
∗
A is as-
sumed. For instance, K∗A can be obtained from K by
means of the Levi Identity and partial meet contraction
functions.
The union [K ′¬A ∪ K
′
G] is not a belief set since
entailment-sets for a sentence in a belief set are not
closed sets. However the closure of this union (i.e. K ′)
is both a belief set and a subset of K since it is the
closure of a subset of K.
Theorem 3 Any subset K ′ ⊆ K that is generated from
entailment-sets of ¬A and G as stipulated by relation
(3) satisfies Theorem 1.
Accessibility Relation
Theorem 1 describes contexts in a general manner with-
out providing a mechanism for defining a specific (op-
timal) context. In this section we introduce the notion
of accessibility as an additional structure for belief sets
that allows us to model optimal contexts.
This relation is defined over sentences in L, as well as
over contexts/sets of sentences. The notion of accessi-
bility is based on the idea that depending on the order
in which our beliefs were acquired, we can assign them
a certain degree of accessibility or we can rank them ac-
cording to the rule: the last acquired belief is the most
accessible one. We will use the notation A ≤a B for “B
is at least as accessible as A”.
The importance of the accessibility notion in the con-
struction of optimal contexts is supported by the abil-
ity of this concept to characterize the effort required
to access pieces of information from someone’s knowl-
edge base. Further, using the accessibility notion one
can express the effort required to process some piece of
information in a certain context.
8With some changes, the definition is borrowed from
Fuhrmann (1991), p.177.
A set of sentences or a context will be considered as
accessible as its least accessible element. The reason is
that whenever one wants to access a certain context or
to process some piece of information in that context,
the effort required for such an operation is determined
by the effort necessary to access the least accessible sen-
tence in that context.
Definition 2 For any set of sentences S in L, if A ∈ S
and A ≤a B for all B ∈ S then S =a A.9
Instead of defining the accessibility of sentences in
a quantitative way, we rather axiomatically define the
qualitative aspect of this notion by introducing five new
postulates.
Definition 3 Given a belief set K in L, an accessibility
order related to K is a relation ≤a on L satisfying the
following conditions:
A1) If A ≤a B and B ≤a C then A ≤a C; (transitivity)
A2) For every two sentences A,B ∈ L, either A ≤a B
or B ≤a A;
A3) A =a ¬A;
A4) A,¬A /∈ K if and only if A ≤a B for all B ∈ L;
A5) Given BK such that Cn(BK) = K, for any set of
sentences XA ⊆ BK such that XA is the most ac-
cessible A-entailment set in BK and A /∈ BK , the
accessibility rank of A is determined by the acces-
sibility rank of XA : A =a XA.
The first two postulates define ≤ as a total transitive
binary relation over sentences in L. Conditions (A3)
and (A4) are better understood if we consider that for
a belief setK, the accessibility rank of a sentence A ∈ L
is determined by the lowest accessibility level to which
we need to go in K in order to determine whether or
not A is the case (given K).10 If A ∈ K, for instance,
then the rank of A is already known. If ¬A ∈ K then A
has the same accessibility level as ¬A since finding out
that ¬A is the case leads to finding out that A is not the
case. This explains postulate (A3). Also, if neither A
nor ¬A are in K then it is impossible to find out given
K whether A (and similarly, ¬A) is the case or not.
Therefore, for this last case, A would be among those
sentences whose level of accessibility is the lowest. This
gives us a reason for formulating the fourth postulate.
Note that condition (A5) does not hold in case A is
a sentence in BK . Since sentences in BK are indepen-
dently acquired, they are ranked according only to the
order in which they have been incorporated in the base,
regardless of their logical relationship. In contrast, the
accessibility ranking of the information that is derived
from the base will be ranked only according to the ranks
of the sentences from which it is obtained by derivation.
Formally, we can describe the relation between the
accessibility ordering and optimal contexts as follows.
9A =a B iff A ≤a B and B ≤a A.
10By definition, we say that sentence A is the case given
K if and only if A ∈ K; A is not the case given K if and
only if A /∈ K, ¬A ∈ K, and A is undetermined given K if
and only if A,¬A /∈ K.
Definition 4 Consider some belief set K, a sentence
A ∈ L, and two sub-theories of K : K ′
1
,K ′
2
, both satis-
fying conditions (1) and ii) as specified in Theorem 1.
Then K ′
1
is preferred over K ′
2
as a potentially optimal
context if and only if K ′
1
is more accessible than K ′
2
.
The postulates suggest the following conclusion and
motivate the next two definitions.
The number of accessibility levels in a base of a belief
set is the same as the number of accessibility levels in
the belief set generated from that base. Moreover, the
accessibility ordering of the base determines the accessi-
bility ordering of the belief set generated from the base.
This property results from the last postulate, (A5).
Definition 5 For a belief set K, an accessibility order-
ing ≤a and a sentence A ∈ K, we define cut≤a(A,K) =
{B | B ∈ K,A ≤a B}.
Definition 6 For a belief set K, a base BK of K, an
accessibility ordering ≤a and a sentence A ∈ K, we
say that cut≤a(A,K) is a bad cut if there is a sen-
tence C ∈ BK such that C ∈ Cn [cut≤a(A,K)] but
C /∈ cut≤a(A,K).
Note then the following result:
Theorem 4 For an accessibility ordering ≤a, a belief
set K and sentence A ∈ K, if cut≤a(A,K) is not a bad
cut then cut≤a(A,K) is a belief set.
This theorem provides a solution for the construction
of optimal contexts. Precisely, this result allows us to
conclude that the subset K ′ which contains K’s most
accessible sentences and satisfies conditions (1) and ii)
as stipulated in Theorem 1 is or includes an optimal
context. However, if K ′ represents a bad cut, an opti-
mal context is a subset of the logical closure of K ′.
Generating an Accessibility Ordering
from a Finite Accessibility Ranking
In this section we define a finite accessibility ranking
from which we will then generate a finitely representable
accessibility ordering. The reason for this action is
to overcome the representation problem whenever an
accessibility ordering ranks an infinite number of sen-
tences. A finite accessibility ranking ranks the sen-
tences of a finite knowledge base. We will see that
for axiomatizable theories/belief sets we can generate
an ordering that ranks all the sentences of that the-
ory/belief set from that finite ranking.
Definition 7 A finite accessibility ranking is an inte-
ger function af : S → (0, n] such that range(af ) =
[1, n]; where S is a finite set of sentences in L and nat-
ural numbers 0 to n designate ranks.
The next definition introduces a way of extending the
domain of the finite ranking af to all the sentences in
the language. The degree of accessibility of a sentence
in the language represents the effort required to access
someone’s beliefs used to find out whether or not that
sentence is accepted by that person.
Definition 8 Let af be a finite accessibility ranking.
The degree of accessibility of a sentence p ∈ L is given
as follows:
a) deg af (p) = n if ⊢ p;
b) deg af (p) = max
i
(min
q
({af (q) | q ∈ X ip})) if p ∈
Cn[dom(af )] and 6⊢ p; where for each i, X ip is a
p-entailment set in Cn [dom(af )]
c) If p /∈ Cn [dom(af )], then deg af (p) is determined
inductively from the degree of accessibility of sen-
tences in p ∈ Cn [dom(af )] using the following
rules:
1) deg af (p) = deg af (¬p);
2) deg af (p) = 0 iff p,¬p /∈ Cn[dom(af )].
The following theorem shows how a finite accessibil-
ity ranking can generate an accessibility ordering using
degrees of accessibility.
Theorem 5 Let af be a finite accessibility ranking
and p, q sentences in L. Define ≤af by p ≤af q iff
deg af (p) ≤ deg af (q). Then ≤af is an accessibility
ordering related to Cn[dom(af )].
Note that for dom(af ) = BK , where BK is a finite
set of sentences such that Cn(BK) = K, ≤af is the
accessibility ordering related to K. Since BK is finite,
K is a finitely axiomatizable theory. In this case the
finite accessibility ranking af generates an accessibility
ranking ≤af over K.
Iterated Optimal Revision
In the introduction it was mentioned that the inquirer’s
desideratum can be fulfilled by several goals. Therefore,
iterative revisions allow the agent to get closer with each
step to the fulfillment of its desideratum. For each it-
eration a certain goal is attained. Each such goal can
either override the previously derived goal(s) or repre-
sent a sub-goal of a final goal that is achieved after a
number of such iterations.
The adjustment that can be brought to the accessi-
bility ranking of the beliefs in a base of a belief set can
be described as follows.
Definition 9 Let BK be a finite set of sentences in L,
p ∈ BK and af a finite accessibility ranking assigned
to BK . We define the adjustment of af, when BK is
revised with A ∈ L, to be a function af ∗ such that:
af ∗(p) =
{
n+ 1 ifp = A or p = ¬A
a(p) ifp /∈ BK
∗
A \BK
0 otherwise
This means that the newly acquired evidence is
placed at the most accessible level. All the beliefs in
the original base are assigned their initial level of ac-
cessibility. The sentences that are retracted from BK
when A is incorporated are assigned the accessibility
ranking/degree as stipulated in part c) of Definition 8.
Conclusions
We have defined a way to change knowledge bases such
that the same effects as those achieved in a conventional
belief revision process are obtained, only with a smaller
processing effort. This approach to belief revision is
founded on notions such as optimal context and acces-
sibility. For the sentential model of belief states we
provide both a formal description of contexts as sub-
theories determined by three parameters and a method
to construct contexts. Next, we introduce an acces-
sibility ordering for belief sets, which we then use for
selecting the best (optimal) contexts with respect to
the processing effort involved in the revision. Then, for
finitely axiomatizable knowledge bases, we characterize
a finite accessibility ranking from which the accessibil-
ity ordering for the entire base is generated and show
how to determine the ranking of an arbitrary sentence
in the language. Finally, we define the adjustment of
the accessibility ranking of a revised base of a belief set.
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